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Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity

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REPORTS > AUTHORS > S. MATTHEW WEINBERG:
All reports by Author S. Matthew Weinberg:

TR11-172 | 20th December 2011
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms

We obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Combined with cyclic-monotonicity our results provide a complete characterization of feasible, Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms for this setting.

Our characterization is enabled by a novel, constructive proof of Border's theorem [Border ... more >>>


TR11-170 | 16th December 2011
Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design

We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder's values for the items are sampled from a ... more >>>




ISSN 1433-8092 | Imprint