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Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity
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REPORTS > AUTHORS > PAUL W. GOLDBERG:
All reports by Author Paul W. Goldberg:

TR06-005 | 13th December 2005
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg

Nash Equilibria in Graphical Games on Trees Revisited

Graphical games have been proposed as a game-theoretic model of large-scale
distributed networks of non-cooperative agents. When the number of players is
large, and the underlying graph has low degree, they provide a concise way to
represent the players' payoffs. It has recently been shown that the problem of
finding ... more >>>


TR05-115 | 27th September 2005
Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou

The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium

We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by
showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game
with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD.
Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence
between polynomial-time solvability of normal-form games and
more >>>


TR05-090 | 17th August 2005
Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou

Reducibility Among Equilibrium Problems

We address the fundamental question of whether the Nash equilibria of
a game can be computed in polynomial time. We describe certain
efficient reductions between this problem for
normal form games with a fixed number of players
and graphical games with fixed degree. Our main result is that ... more >>>




ISSN 1433-8092 | Imprint