ECCC
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity
Login | Register | Classic Style



REPORTS > AUTHORS > PAUL W. GOLDBERG:
All reports by Author Paul W. Goldberg:

TR06-005 | 13th December 2005
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg

Nash Equilibria in Graphical Games on Trees Revisited

Graphical games have been proposed as a game-theoretic model of large-scale distributed networks of non-cooperative agents. When the number of players is large, and the underlying graph has low degree, they provide a concise way to represent the players' payoffs. It has recently been shown that the problem of finding ... more >>>

TR05-115 | 27th September 2005
Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou

The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium

We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence between polynomial-time solvability of normal-form games and ... more >>>

TR05-090 | 17th August 2005
Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou

Reducibility Among Equilibrium Problems

We address the fundamental question of whether the Nash equilibria of a game can be computed in polynomial time. We describe certain efficient reductions between this problem for normal form games with a fixed number of players and graphical games with fixed degree. Our main result is that the problem ... more >>>



ISSN 1433-8092 | Imprint