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Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity
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REPORTS > AUTHORS > XIAOTIE DENG:
All reports by Author Xiaotie Deng:

TR06-037 | 10th February 2006
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng

On the Complexity of 2D Discrete Fixed Point Problem

While the 3-dimensional analogue of the Sperner problem in the plane was known to be PPAD-complete, the complexity of the 2D-SPERNER itself is not known to be PPAD-complete or not. In this paper, we settle this open problem proposed by Papadimitriou~\cite{PAP90} fifteen years ago. This also allows us to derive ... more >>>

TR06-023 | 7th February 2006
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Shang-Hua Teng

Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity

By proving that the problem of computing a $1/n^{\Theta(1)}$-approximate Nash equilibrium remains \textbf{PPAD}-complete, we show that the BIMATRIX game is not likely to have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in $n$ and $1/\epsilon$ can compute an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of an $n\times ... more >>>

TR05-140 | 30th November 2005
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng

Settling the Complexity of 2-Player Nash-Equilibrium

Revisions: 1
We prove that finding the solution of two player Nash Equilibrium is PPAD-complete. more >>>

TR05-134 | 17th November 2005
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng

3-NASH is PPAD-Complete

In this paper, we improve a recent result of Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou on PPAD-completeness of 4-Nash, showing that 3-Nash is PPAD-complete. more >>>

TR05-074 | 8th June 2005
Li-Sha Huang, Xiaotie Deng

On Complexity of Market Equilibria with Maximum Social Welfare

We consider the computational complexity of the market equilibrium problem by exploring the structural properties of the Leontief exchange economy. We prove that, for economies guaranteed to have a market equilibrium, finding one with maximum social welfare or maximum individual welfare is NP-hard. In addition, we prove that counting the ... more >>>



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